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Abstract
This editorial provides a review of the current ways in
which health economics is impacting on policy and
reviews some of the key ethical and value-judgmental
issues that commonly arise in and as a result of the
work of economists. It also briefly highlights the
contributions of the authors of this special issue of the
journal, all of which illustrate how economists have
approached ethical issues in health service policy (both
in its financing and its delivery), and some of which
explore the major methodological matters that arise
and go on to discuss their potential as sources of
conflict or harmony with other approaches to the same
questions.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:217–222)
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Introduction
The main idea behind this special issue of the jour-
nal was to provide a “snapshot” picture of what
economists have (and have had) to say about some
of the key ethical and value-judgmental issues that
arise in financing and providing health care subject
to resource constraints, which is, of course, the uni-
versal situation though the constraints in some
countries bite harder than others. The picture was
also intended to convey what economists are think-
ing about their approaches to these questions as
well as the substantive things they have to say about
them.
While the questions are universal and timeless,
there are several reasons why it is particularly timely
to consider the way in which health economics and
ethics interact and how economists have ap-
proached the many value-judgmental issues that
arise in their research and policy advice. One is that
economics has now come of age as one of the key
disciplines that underpin a good deal of policy–at
least in the UK. The recent white paper, The NHS
Plan: a Plan for Investment, a Plan for Reform,1
devoted an entire chapter (chapter 3) to a
discussion of the pros and cons of alternative means
of funding health care in the UK in which the eth-
ics of both eYciency and equity were reviewed for
the first time in such a document. Moreover, the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is
a key element in the UK government’s reforms of
the National Health Service (NHS) in England and
Wales and it uses economics explicitly in its
appraisal of technologies for possible use in the
NHS and as a part of its clinical guideline develop-
ment programme. For this reason alone, it seems
appropriate to review how it is that economists set
about the ethical issues that arise, partly to encour-
age wider professional participation and partly to
support the increasing lay participation in health
care decision making at all levels in the UK by
making explicit and accessible what may otherwise
be hidden within arcane processes and too techni-
cal to enable wider dialogue. Another reason is that
economists (or, come to that, other professional
groups) are not qualified to make the value
judgments that are embodied in decisions. They are
rather good at identifying the necessity for making
value judgments and at spelling out the nature of the
value judgments that are needed. They are often
forced to make value judgments in the absence of
any other more appropriate mechanism for making
them but value judgments made in this way must be
seen as provisional, or as cockshies to focus the
attention of better qualified others to engage with
the issues. Such value judgments cannot be
regarded as authoritative or as having been arrived
at through an authoritative process. Indeed, some
economists have devoted a good deal of energy to
devising experimental procedures for yielding value
judgments, for example by asking lay people in sys-
tematic ways to reveal them. A third reason is that
economists, along with many others, have recently
devoted much thought to the question of equity,
both in general theorising about it and in the con-
text of national and international programmes
which have increasingly come to be seen as needing
to address issues of equity through explicit analysis
rather than merely by largely empty posturing and
sloganising.
The kind of value judgment that economists have
mostly been concerned with relates to the objectives
of health care systems, to distributive justice, and to
ways of resolving clashes between eYciency (max-
imising something subject to resource constraints)
and equity (distributive fairness). A good example
of the first of these is the question of what health
services are for. The usual approach adopted by
economists is to assume that the objective is a weak
form of utilitarianism, so that the test of an
improvement in social welfare becomes the Pare-
tian one of whether any change can be made that
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(after compensation via market and other transac-
tions) increases any individual’s welfare without
reducing anyone else’s. If so, the change ought to be
made (it would increase eYciency); if not, the
change ought or ought not to be made–the test
cannot tell since it does not allow interpersonal
welfare comparisons. It is silent (hence the “weak-
ness” of this brand of utilitarianism). Many health
economists, however, adopt a diVerent approach to
the social maximand. Instead of postulating a
Paretian-style utilitarian objective, they are more
empirical, drawing on evidence about what it seems
that those with “legitimate” authority (such as gov-
ernment ministers?) seem to think the objective
ought to be and being much less squeamish about
making interpersonal comparisons. Using this
approach, health economists have tended to take, as
an approximation to the objective, the maximisa-
tion of “health” or “health gain”, which are
oft-stated ministerial objectives. But there are two
ethical issues that immediately arise (and which
most health economists have been very explicit
about): one is indeed the question of what the
objective ought to be (and the related question of
what or who is to be regarded as an “authoritative”
source) but the other is the question of what
“health” or “health gain” is to be taken as meaning.
In the case of the latter question, the typical
approach is reductionist and the following “ought”
questions arise (I make no claims to exhaustiveness
here). Which aspects of human functioning ought
to be taken into account? How ought they to be
scaled in terms of “better” or “worse”? How
“strong” ought the scaling measurement to be
(ordinal or cardinal)? How ought diVerent ratings
of diVerent aspects be combined or traded oV?
What “utility” score ought to be attached to
combinations of ratings? Ought the resultant “utili-
ties” to be discounted when they relate to future
health states and, if so, at what discount rate?
Should they be further discounted for uncertainty
and, if so, how? What weight should be attached to
rated health states accruing to diVerent people (the
relatively healthy compared to the relatively sick,
young relative to old, rich relative to poor, chronic
suVerers compared to acute, and so on)? As the list
makes clear, questions of distributive fairness lurk
even within a question that began as one of
eYciency.
Long history
The ethical questions of how best to finance health
care and regulate its production and distribution
have a long history in health economics and,
indeed, may be said to have been the questions that
set the subject oV.2 Economists have been divided
on the “right” answers to these questions, broadly
falling into “libertarian” and “collectivist” camps
(these are very loose terms)–that is, when they go
beyond mere economics and engage in advocacy
(see Towse3 for an example of such a division,Cu-
lyer, Maynard and Williams4 for relative objectivity
and Culyer and Evans5 for a scolding).
In contrast to this “high level” sort of ethical
debate, it is easy to see that the increasing explicit-
ness of health care decision making (albeit still at
quite a high level, organisationally speaking) will
inevitably focus attention on diYcult ethical posers
that were previously fudged. Explicitness is largely
taken for granted by economists as a desideratum.
Some of these issues can be well illustrated by using
a UK example–the recent creation of the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence referred to earlier.
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence is
required to make recommendations to the NHS as
to the medical technologies that ought to be used to
maximise health gain and to develop authoritative
clinical guidelines for medical and other practition-
ers. Cost-eVectiveness is a major consideration and
health gain is taken as a major maximand. The
most widely used measure of health gain is the
Quality Adjusted LifeYear (QALY) which has the
advantage that it enables inter-technology compari-
sons to be made. As a first approximation, maxim-
ising health gain entails setting the cost per QALY
as near as possible to equality across all technolo-
gies. Thus, technologies with a “low” cost per
QALY (at a relevant margin) are to be preferred to
those with a “high” cost per QALY (again at the
margin). The logic is straightforward: if resources
were to be transferred from a high to a low cost per
QALY technology, keeping the eVective budget for
the NHS constant, overall health gain would rise
and would continue to rise until (at the margin) the
cost per QALY for each conceivable technology was
brought into equality. If health maximisation is an
ethical objective, then the use of such a method is
also ethical (provided, of course, it is done in a way
that does not violate other ethical desiderata). Over
time (and it may be only a very short time), it is
apparent that there will emerge a marginal cost per
QALY that becomes a kind of threshold–a technol-
ogy lying above it (at the margin) will not be
recommended. Such a threshold has never been
made public or subject to public discussion (at least
in the UK). Yet it appears inevitable that it will
emerge (or be deduced by keen-eyed observers). Its
emergence (or deduction) will play a critical role in
debates about the appropriate size of health care
expenditure, because those denied benefit (whether
manufacturers or patients) will see that the
argument has to shift from one about shares of
spending to the overall level of spending. Expecta-
tions about what can be expected from increased
spending will become much more focused and
policy too will become much more focused. Indeed,
it is possible to see the UK experiment with clinical
governance as essentially being about just such a
focus: a means of assuring central budget-holders
that additional expenditures will generate real
improvements in health rather than simply creating
rents for those who provide care and perpetuating
ineYcient resource allocations.
Citizens Council
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence will
also confront explicitly the question of which values
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are to be adopted in QALY (or any other) outcome
measures. In the UK, the setting up of a Citizens
Council was motivated by just such a considera-
tion. The government’s idea here is that important
matters of ethical judgment (of which the ethics
embodied in QALYs must surely count as amongst
the most important) ought to be tackled by a
representative sample of the general population.
This form of “citizens’ jury” is thus seen as one
answer to the question of the “authoritative” source
of value judgments.
Dearth of evidence
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence’s
decision making will also inevitably cause it to con-
front possible clashes between eYciency and
distributive fairness. Whereas ethicists, like econo-
mists, are likely to have considered such conflicts
mainly in the abstract (or at least in imaginary cir-
cumstances), NICE decision makers will have to
consider them in concrete circumstances. The
National Institute for Clinical Excellence’s inherit-
ance included a dearth of evidence on cost-
eVectiveness and some patchy evidence of inequity
(one type of which is often described as “post code
prescribing”, according to which what you get
depends on where you live). Now consider a
scenario in which a particular treatment for a
chronic condition had an unknown cost-
eVectiveness and, as a consequence, was available
in some localities but not in others because
diVerent local decision makers reached their own
conclusions as to whether to fund it. Suppose
NICE determines that the cost-eVectiveness of the
treatment lies well above any threshold cost per
QALY. The recommendation on eYciency grounds
is clear: do not use. Let us take a prime principle of
distributive fairness to be a form of horizontal
equity: persons in like need ought to be treated in
the same way. Three possibilities now suggest
themselves: (1) withdraw the treatment from those
already receiving it, (2) retain the treatment for
those receiving it but do not prescribe it for new
patients, (3) allow all to receive it for whom it is
judged appropriate by their doctors, even though it
is ineYcient. Which option should be chosen? Eco-
nomics cannot provide the answer (though it may
provide some relevant information to aid those who
have to answer the question), neither can medicine
or epidemiology, since no practitioner of these sci-
ences is especially qualified to make value judg-
ments on behalf of the rest of us.
There are a great many attractions to settling
ethical matters such as these by reference to an
“authoritative” source of value. One is that it opens
an ethical debate about what kind of “authority”
ought to exist to guide those empowered to make
practical decisions about procedures. Another is
that it defines roles: the professions involved in
making the scientific judgments can provide the
essential contextual information to inform those
authorised to make, or advise on, the value
judgments. Another is that it stops scientists from
injecting (imposing?) their own value judgments,
using their scientific expertise to lend a spurious
authority to their values and preferences. But the
principal advantage is that such procedures are
open (and hence challengeable both as regards
procedure and as regards the outcome of the
procedure) and also have a degree of “authority”
that would otherwise be lacking.
Evidence-based policy and evidence-based
medical practice need, most economists would
agree, an evidential base for their value-judgmental
content. The ballot box serves only for the broadest
of values. At more specific levels, the interaction
between those whom it is decided ought to
determine the values required for a particular pur-
pose and those with technical knowledge, under-
standing and the ability to specify (at least some of)
the key value judgmental issues, seems to beckon in
a new era of what might be termed “empirical eth-
ics”. This is not “applied ethics” in its usual sense
but the study of the quantification of particular
kinds of ethical value. Economists have played a
major role in ushering in this new era–and in defin-
ing the issues that empirical ethics might usefully
address.
The articles in this issue
Alan Maynard’s article is a thought-provoking
attack on the implicitness of so much ethics in
health care and the arbitrary outcomes that arise in
the absence of systematic facing-up to, and
obfuscation of, the central issues involved in
allocating health care resources: being clear about
objectives and analytical about the means of
achieving them. He argues pugnaciously for explic-
itness on the grounds that it is a protection against
self-seeking behaviours and is more likely to deliver
the objectives sought, and that without it policy
makers and practitioners cannot be held to account
(apparently even in the next world, though that
begs a question about the information base
available there for such ultimate judgments!). He
does not specify the sorts of means he judges to be
appropriate instruments for his idealised health
care system based on science and rationality but it
would certainly be possible to see a good deal of the
UK Labour government’s programme for the NHS
as oVering a comprehensive attempt to achieve just
what he is advocating.
Bosanquet takes economists to task for not
adopting the research agenda he prefers. He is
almost certainly wrong, however, in saying that
economists have become too concerned with equity
questions–had they achieved more in this regard,
the NICE guidance on how to conduct technology
appraisals would not have been the weak aVair that
it is in respect of guidance on how to handle equity
matters. He is surely right, however, in observing
that our understanding of behaviour-governing and
regulatory frameworks to promote evidence-based,
cost-eVective and, come to that, equitable practice
is very poor. A characteristic of nearly all the litera-
ture of health economics since its inception2 is its
focus on the demand side. Nearly all the theory
used to underpin arguments for public health
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insurance and heavily publicly subsidised services
are arguments from the demand side. None of these
arguments has any bearing on the relative problems
and costs of public provision versus public contract-
ing with private providers which the uncontrolled
experiment with public agencies “contracting” with
providers in (and later increasing outside) the NHS
in the UK actually shed little light upon (but see
Chalkley and Malcomson6 for a survey). So there
remains a big question on the eYciency agenda:
what ought the balance between private and public
provision within a public (but not necessarily pub-
licly owned) service to be, and through what
instruments might an eYcient balance be attained?
Viewed in terms of outcomes, the ethics in this
question are primarily to do with the ethics of eY-
ciency itself: the eYcient balance (that is, the
balance that maximises the value of outcomes for
given resources) and the equitable balance (that is,
the balance that delivers equity objectives) will be
ethical balances by virtue of their delivering
eYciency in both and in the trade-oV between them
when there is conflict. But there may also be proc-
esses as well as outcomes whose equity requires
evaluation. This is an interesting and important
agenda.
Market failures
The demand-side nature of the economics of pub-
lic finance for health care is well illustrated by Hur-
ley’s article. He explores three approaches to the
welfare economics of health care: classical utilitari-
anism, extra-welfarism and Rawlsian contractarian-
ism. He advocates an instrumentalist approach to
the meaning of the “need” for health care–the entity
asserted to be needed must be needed for an ethi-
cal end (such as human flourishing) and the entity
must be eVective (possibly cost-eVective) in serving
that ethical end. He identifies the market failures
that can prevent the attainment of an eYcient allo-
cation of resources for meeting needs as well as the
equity desiderata that are hard for market methods
to deliver, most of which stem from the universal
truth that wealth and health are positively corre-
lated in societies, which means that provision has to
be directed at need rather than demand and that
health insurance has to find a way of reversing the
natural state in which those least able to pay for it
are most in need of it. Like other authors in this
issue, he makes a strong claim on behalf of
economics as a taxonomising device: clarifying
concepts in relevant ways, breaking them up into
specific manageable issues in the classic reduction-
ist fashion, quantifying them where possible, and
oVering them up as topics for multidisciplinary
inquiry.
Rice considers the standard utility-maximising
approach of welfare economics as applied to health
care as supplemented by liberal and libertarian
arguments for distributive fairness in the context of
the rights of individuals to autonomy in choice.
This is contrasted with views that give health care
(or, perhaps, health) the special status of a primary
good and emphasise greater equality at the price of
a sacrifice of individual autonomy. EYciency argu-
ments, let alone equity ones, for market-based free-
dom of choice fail on grounds of externality–which
goes to show that even economic reductionists can
provide examples of the whole being greater (or
smaller) than the sum of the parts! There is a strong
case to be made on both sides but he concludes that
one primary good (health) trumps another (free-
dom from interference) on the ground that
endowed allocations of health are inherently
arbitrary, as are eVorts to separate ill health into
that which is self-induced (unworthy of public sup-
port) and that which is random (worthy of public
support). Not explicitly stated, though it seems
implicit, is another ground: that health trumps
freedom because it is usually a necessary condition
to have the one in order to be able to enjoy the
other.
Dowie uses the ideas of cost-eVectiveness and
QALYs to open up some ethical issues in both the
way health economists do their work and commu-
nications across disciplines. The ground is cleared
by an uncompromising classification of health
economists as “analytical consequentialists” (being
neither intuitionists nor absolutists) and by making
clear that the oft-misunderstood concept of oppor-
tunity cost means health gain deliberately forgone
as an act of choice. With this uncompromising
opening, he then dissects the objections that have
been made to the economic approach in the
contexts of both eYciency and equity and con-
cludes that much of the opposition has actually
taken the form of a search to achieve a particular
form of ascendancy through the application of
double standards. Thus, those adopting intuitive
approaches to questions of ethics in health care
have required those taking an analytical approach
(ie economists) to convey the analytical case in
intuitive terms (or else they judge it to have failed).
Those approaching ethical questions in health with
an analytical approach are usually adept at
identifying analytical and empirical weaknesses
(that is, after all, why they are analysts and they are
usually much better at it than the intuitionist oppo-
sition). These are then held up as “weaknesses” by
the intuitionists, even though their own method
masks any specific “weaknesses”. Moreover, not
being analytical, intuitionists are not usually very
good at tackling weaknesses (for example, by turn-
ing them into strengths) or identifying the circum-
stances under which the weaknesses are likely to
mislead (or even cripple) and are hence not to be
used.
Empirical approach
Williams argues for an empirical approach to
answering the key ethical questions that arise in
fairly high level decision making contexts, where
ethical impasses are often reached, such as how
eYciency and equity ought to be traded-oV when
they conflict, or which ethical basis for assessing
equity ought to be adopted. He observes that views
about ethical issues are rarely simply binary (for
example, “important”, “not important”) but reflect
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strengths of view which vary according to “how
much” of an ineYciency or inequity may exist, and
its character, and which also vary across individuals
and for each individual over time. The issues then
become those of identifying those who are to be the
appropriate “authorities” (or who may have the
“authority” to make recommendations to a higher
“authority”) and of devising experimental methods
to reveal the trade-oVs that the selected subjects
actually make when confronted with actual choices.
He reviews and rejects a number of objections to
“quantification” (for example that it lacks sensitiv-
ity to the “infinite variety of human experience”,
and that it is “mechanistic”) which hark back to
Dowie’s discussion of intuitionist objections to the
analytical approach.
Territorial equity
Rice and Smith examine territorial equity, such as
the ethical issues arising in the allocation of budgets
to health care commissioners (health authorities
and primary care trusts in the UK) or regions in
other countries such as New Zealand. They refer to
the extensive evidence on variations between areas
in terms of health and intervention rates that seem
to be explained only by region of residence or treat-
ment and have little relation to any underlying epi-
demiology, morbidity or clinical need. The issues
that arise are problems in both vertical and
horizontal equity. They argue for capitation-based
systems that distinguish between “legitimate”
determinants and “illegitimate” determinants of
what expenditure ought to be. Historical utilisation
is criticised as a determinant because it fails to take
account of need, much of which may have been
unmet (to use historical utilisation would imply
that inherited unmet needs are unimportant). They
conclude that policies to reduce arbitrary geo-
graphical inequalities can best be couched in terms
of those which tackle variations in the quality of
care, variations in the accessibility of care and fac-
tors outside the control of health care agencies.
Clinical governance or other forms of performance
management may be the primary method for deal-
ing with quality variations; supplementary resource
allocations may be the most eVective way of
tackling variations in accessibility. Tackling the
third source of variation may require explicit
preferential access (and resourcing) and the
abandonment of clinical need as an indicator of
regional diVerences in need, together with a more
joined-up approach that addresses a wider set of
policies directed at health rather than just the health
care services themselves.
WagstaV addresses an even higher level equity
problem: that facing the World Bank in helping
countries to improve the health of the poor and
reduce the impoverishing eVects of illness. The
character of the issues is not, however, so very dif-
ferent from those discussed by other authors: the
question of trade-oV (here, for example, between
overall increases in health and reductions in the
health diVerences between the health of the rich
and poor) and the use of analysis (here, for
example, the properties of diVerent weighting
schemes and the degree to which they meet ethical
distributional criteria). A matter that is also
touched on by Rice and Smith in this issue of the
journal relates to the question of whether all
inequalities are equally bad, to which one answer
appears to be that those that matter are those that
arise from diVerences in the constraining (full)
prices people confront rather than the choices they
make when they have the same opportunities.
These “prices” are not just a question of money but
also relate to time costs, distances from health care
facilities and a host of other factors that make the
eVective price higher than the money price and that
cause substantial diVerences in the opportunities
confronting diVerent people in the same country.
Such considerations also raise the issue of whether
policies directed at health improvements and
reductions in health inequity might be better
implemented through poverty reduction pro-
grammes and other non-health care means rather
than through health care. Then there are (even
higher) levels of equity to be addressed–for
example, inter-country allocation–and the extent to
which it is proper to take account of the integrity of
local governance structures and practices, the
degree of local “ownership” and control that is both
fair and eVective (and the associated trade-oVs that
may be inherent here). The issue of public versus
private provision in the context of a publicly financed
health care system is also raised, as is the Rawlsian
issue of whether international agency support that
improves the lot of the well-oV as a means of
improving that of the poorly-oV is ethically
justifiable (supposing, of course, that there was a
firm evidence base for believing that it actually
works in practice).
Cost-eVectiveness principles
Weinstein tackles the trade-oV issue at a lower
level–that of the physician as gate-keeper. At a suf-
ficiently high level, the decisions are not about
identified individuals whose personal circum-
stances are known (perhaps intimately) to the deci-
sion maker but about classes of persons such as
people in a particular social class, or income
category, or those having particular family respon-
sibilities, or having a particular disease. At this level,
questions are about the terms on which services are
to be made available and to whom. The benefits to
one group are compared (at the margin) with those
to another (again at the margin) in order to maxim-
ise something (such as health) and to secure an
equitable distribution of something (such as access
or equity). Even if all these issues have been settled
in some way deemed to be satisfactory, there
remains the issue of how similar types of resource-
constrained decision are to be made at the level of
the individual–for example, comparing the likely
benefit to the patient in front of the doctor with the
potential benefit to one who has yet to appear.
Weinstein contrasts the agency role of a physician
seeking the best for her own patients with the phy-
sician in a diVerent agency role: seeking the best for
Culyer 221
www.jmedethics.com
society as a whole. His analysis suggests that
cost-eVectiveness principles, consistently applied,
can generate guidelines for decisions that do not
involve the doctor in invidious breach of the trust-
ing relationship with patients. He suggests that this
is made much more eVective if doctors’ choices are
governed by well-designed incentives (for example,
capitation payment may be preferable to fee-for-
service), suitably designed budgets (in order to
reduce the prevalence of sub-optimising), well-
designed clinical guidelines (coupled with a degree
of permitted flexibility in their use) and a major
attempt at public education and public enlistment
in the business of what in the UK would be called
clinical governance. It is likely that the kind of
“buy-in” he seeks is more easily obtained in the UK
and other countries with a tradition of more-or-less
open acknowledgment of resource limitations in
health care than in the USA.
Finally my own paper discusses conflicts between
concepts of equity. A common focus of economists
has been on the potential conflict between equity
and eYciency. There are, however, important con-
flicts between equity concepts which even a plural-
ist approach cannot accommodate. Within one
approach to equity (meeting needs equitably) the
ambiguities of the term “need” are explored and a
resolution suggested. Some of the other key issues
needing to be resolved are identified, their signifi-
cance explained, and their consequences for policy
outlined.
There are, of course, many aspects of medical
ethics that economists have not actively considered
and, of those they have, the ones discussed in this
issue of the journal is but a subset. I hope none the
less that the range is suYciently broad to engage the
interest of non-economist readers and to enable
and encourage them to enter into more eVective
dialogues with economists. One reassuring thing
ought to be clear: health economists have a good
track record of collaboration with the practitioners
of other disciplines and recognise the need for such
collaboration if the research programmes they
aspire to are to be developed as well as they ought
to be. Moreover, there are now policy customers
“out there” for the sort of work to be done, so the
environment could scarcely be more conducive to
such work than it currently is.
Anthony J Culyer is Professor of Economics, Depart-
ment of Economics & Related Subjects, University of
York,Heslington, York.
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News and notes
International Symposium: The State of ART Regulation—
International Perspectives
A one-day international symposium, The State of
ART Regulation–International Perspectives, will be
held in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia on Friday
November 23 2001.
Participants at the symposium will hear from
expert speakers about the status of regulation of
assisted reproductive technology in diVerent coun-
tries around the world and discuss the challenges
faced by those regulating and accrediting infertility
services. The symposium will be held prior to the
17th world Congress on Fertility and Sterility, which
is scheduled for November 24 2001 to December 1
2001.
Presentations providing an overview of Europe,
New Zealand, the USA and Australia are now
confirmed, and other presentations are being
finalised. The afternoon programme will consider
the vexed issues of donor procedures, eligibility to
access assisted reproduction, and embryo research.
Papers are now being called for the afternoon
session of the symposium, which will address the three
areas above, in concurrent programme sessions. If you
are interested in presenting a paper, please email
hszoke@ita.org.au for an outline of the programme
themes.
Registrations are also now being called for the sym-
posium. Only one hundred places are available so
early registration is advised. For a copy of the
registration form please email: hszoke@ita.org.au or
write to: The State of ART Symposium, c/- ITA,
30/570 Bourke Street, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
3000. The registration fee will be $100.00 and the
venue will be University College, College Crescent,
Parkville.
For further information please contact: Helen
Szoke, ITA, 30/570 Bourke Street, Melbourne, Victo-
ria, Australia 3000. Ph: 61 3 8601 5250; fax: 61 3
8601 5277; email: hszoke@ita.org.au
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